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ABSTRACT
Integrating SAT with MDG for Eﬃcient Invariant Checking
Khaza Anuarul Hoque
Multiway Decision Graph (MDG) is a canonical representation of a subset of
many-sorted ﬁrst-order logic. It generalizes the logic of equality with abstract types
and uninterpreted function symbols. The area of Satisﬁability (SAT) has been the
subject of intensive research in recent years, with signiﬁcant theoretical and practi-
cal contributions. From a practical perspective, a large number of very eﬀective SAT
solvers have recently been proposed, most of which based on improvements made
to the original Davis-Putnam algorithm. Local search algorithms have allowed solv-
ing extremely large satisﬁable instances of SAT. The combination between various
veriﬁcation methodologies will enhance the capabilities of each and overcome their
limitations. In this thesis, we introduce a methodology and propose a new design
veriﬁcation tool integrating MDG and SAT, to check the safety of a design by in-
variant checking. Using MDG to encode the set of states provide powerful mean
of abstraction. We use SAT solver searching for paths of reachable states violating
the property under certain encoding constraints. In addition, we also introduce an
automated conversion-veriﬁcation methodology to convert a Directed Formula (DF)
into Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) formula that can be fed to a SAT solver. The
formal veriﬁcation of this conversion is conducted within the HOL theorem prover.
Finally, we implement and conduct experiment on some examples along with a case
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Faulty systems (bugs in digital systems) can be very dangerous and very expensive;
especially for those which have safety-critical applications such as Magnetic Res-
onance Imaging (MRI) machines, space shuttles, microprocessors and so on. For
example, bugs in Therac-25 machine caused 3 deaths and 3 serious injuries in 1985.
In 1994, FDIV bug in Intel pentium processor caused them about $500 million USD
followed by Mars polar lander loss in 1996 which cost NASA $165 million USD. There
is a great advantage in being able to verify the correctness of such systems, whether
they are hardware, software, or a combination. In the case of safety-critical systems,
this is most obvious, but also applies to those that are commercially-critical, such
as mass-produced chips. Formal veriﬁcation methods have quite recently become
usable by industry and there is a growing demand for professionals able to apply
them [58]. Detection of bugs in design involves extra eﬀort, time and cost. The
overhead is even worse if the bug is detected late in the design process increasing
the overall cost of the chip as well. The traditional debugging technique is simu-
lation. However, due to the increasing size and complexity of VLSI circuits, it is
impossible to simulate large designs properly. To overcome these limitations, formal
1
veriﬁcation comes into play as a complement to simulation to detect errors in the
design as early as possible.
Formal veriﬁcation techniques have origins in the ﬁeld of applied mathematics
and have been successfully used in the past to prove that the implementation of a
design meets its speciﬁcation. These techniques can be categorized into two main
groups: (1) state exploration based techniques [51], namely model checking and
equivalence checking, and (2) deductive reasoning based techniques, namely theo-
rem proving. Both of these techniques have their own strengths and weaknesses.
Equivalence and model checkers are automatic tools and can be used by an engineer
with no special knowledge about formal methods. These techniques, however, suﬀer
from the state space explosion problem [36]. On the other hand, veriﬁcation using
theorem proving with higher-order-logics is not an automatic technique but can be
applied to larger sized problems. Strengths and weakness of both, state exploration
method and deductive theorem proving are summarized in Table 1.1 [11].
Table 1.1: Deductive theorem proving vs. state exploration method
Method State exploration method Deductive method
Automation completely automatic interactive
Domain size ﬁnite system inﬁnite system
(large) (complex)
Debugging generates expert based
counter-example
Multiway Decision Graphs (MDGs) [25], are a special kind of decision diagrams
that subsumes Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) and extends them by canonically
and compactly representing a subset of ﬁrst-order functions. The MDG system is
a decision diagram-based veriﬁcation tool, primarily designed for hardware veriﬁ-
cation. MDG tool supports both equivalence checking and model checking. With
MDGs, a data value is represented by a single variable of an abstract type and oper-
ations on data are represented in terms of an uninterpreted functions. MDGs consist
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of a set of algorithms. The speciﬁcation and the implementation of the design are
described using Hardware Description Languages (HDL) and then translated into
the decision diagrams via intermediate languages. The algorithms in the system are
used to eﬃciently and automatically deal with the decision diagrams so as to obtain
a correct result.
Satisﬁability Checking (SAT)-based tools to perform various forms of model
checking has achieved a lot of attention these days [29, 9], as they are less sensitive
to the problem sizes and the state explosion problem of classical Binary Decision Di-
agram (BDD)-based [21] model checkers. Expressing transition relation using Con-
junctive Normal Form (CNF) along with SAT is an alternative to decision graphs
and BDD-based approach. Such an approach, performance wise, is less sensitive to
the problem size. As a result, many researchers have developed methods for per-
forming Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [40, 71] using SAT. The common theme
in these works is to convert the problem of interest into a SAT problem, by ﬁguring
out an appropriate propositional Boolean formula, and to utilize other non-canonical
representations of state sets. These methods exploit the ability of SAT solvers to ﬁnd
a single satisfying solution, when it exists. In the recent years the SAT solver tech-
nology has improved signiﬁcantly and a number of sophisticated packages are now
available. Some of the well known state-of-the-art SAT solvers include CHAFF [62],
GRASP [59] and SATO [80]. Most of the model checking techniques, in their im-
plementation, involve state set manipulations. The state set manipulation problem
can be transformed into a SAT problem. SAT solvers, thus, have the potential of
enormously boosting the speed and applicability of model checking techniques.
In [9], an overview of a very interesting methodology integrating SAT and
MDG model checker tool, was presented by the authors with preliminary experi-
mental results. They used a rewriting based SAT solver to prune the transition
relation of the circuits to produce a smaller one that is fed to the MDG model
checker. The basic idea was to use the SAT solver as a reduction engine within
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the MDG model checker tool [25]. In our work, we propose a new methodology to
build a veriﬁcation tool for invariant checking. An invariant is a liner time property
that is given by a condition φ for the states and requires that φ holds for all the
states. For our proposed methodology we use SAT [33] as a veriﬁcation engine for
MDG models. MDG as data structure, for representing transition systems or set
of states, provide a powerful means for abstraction in order to suit large models
intended for model checking. As an alternative of using MDG as a stand alone tool
for invariant checking, we explore the beneﬁts of combining SAT and MDG in our
proposed methodology- for a new veriﬁcation tool.
1.2 Formal Veriﬁcation Techniques
Formal veriﬁcation is a technique to prove mathematically that an implementation
satisﬁes a given set of speciﬁcation. The implementation(description of the design)
to be veriﬁed can be described at diﬀerent level of abstraction which leads in to
diﬀerent veriﬁcation methods. The class of the implementation system or circuit
to be veriﬁed is another issue. For example diﬀerent veriﬁcation approaches may
be required for combinational/sequential, synchronous/asynchronous, pipelined or
non-pipelined circuits. The correctness of the system is determined with respect to
properties derived from speciﬁcation. In practice, implementation and speciﬁcation
both are needed to be modeled in the tool. Then formal veriﬁcation algorithm of
that tool is applied to check the correctness of the system. A counter example is
generated to trace error/errors, if the veriﬁcation fails.
Although formal veriﬁcation techniques use mathematical reasoning to estab-
lish that an implementation meets the speciﬁcation, such correctness proof cannot
guarantee that a real device will never malfunction. An actual device may still show
unintended behavior, even if the hardware design is proved correct using formal ver-
iﬁcation tool. Wrong speciﬁcation can play a major role in this or defects in physical
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fabrication can cause this problem too. In formal veriﬁcation, a model of the design
is veriﬁed rather than a real physical implementation. As a result, a fault in the
modeling process can result in false negatives (design errors that do not exist).





In theorem proving, both the implementation and speciﬁcation is described in formal
logic. The correctness is obtained by mathematically proving their relationship
formed as a theorem [48]. The logic is characterized by a proof system which refers
to a set of axioms and a set of inference rules. Inference rules are applied until the
desired theorem is proven. HOL(Higher Order Logic), ISABELLE, PVS (Prototype
Veriﬁcation System) and ACL2 [57, 64, 68, 50] are some of the high performance
theorem provers. Unfortunately, using theorem prover requires expertise. Using
theorem prover for veriﬁcation is a white box approach, which means user is expected
to know the whole design. It is not fully automated and requires a large amount
of time on the part of the user in developing speciﬁcations of each component and
in guiding the theorem prover through a large set of lemmas. A theorem prover
may sometimes provide an insight into the reasons why a proof failed but is unable
to provide counter-example in case the proof fails. The higher-order logics used in
theorem proving are expressive. As a result, they allow modeling and veriﬁcation of
very complex systems and circuits very easily. Because they require a considerable
interactive eﬀort, theorem provers have less practice in industry and are mainly used
for safety critical applications.
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1.2.2 Equivalence Checking
Equivalence checking is a method to prove that two designs, represented at two
diﬀerent levels of abstraction of the same system are functionally equivalent [48]. A
possible common scenario of equivalence checking can be comparing a circuit’s gate-
netlist description with its RTL description. Equivalence checking is usually divided
into two classes: Combinational equivalence checking and Sequential equivalence
checking. In combinational equivalence checking, the circuits to be compared are
converted into canonical representation of Boolean functions, usually BDDs [21]
which are then structurally compared. MDG [38] in academia, Synopsys Formality
and Cadence Conformal [6] in the industry are two examples of tools that oﬀer
combination equivalence checking. On the other hand, in sequential equivalence
checking, the given two designs are represented using state-encoding and later on the
equivalence is then established by building the product ﬁnite state machine followed
by checking whether the output is invariant for any initial states of the product
machine. Sequential equivalence checking can verify between RTL and behavioral
models because it only considers the behaviors of the models while ignoring details
of the implementation. However, state space explosion problem restricts it from
checking large designs. MDG and VIS [7] are examples of tools which can perform
sequential equivalence checking.
1.2.3 Model Checking
Model checking as a veriﬁcation technique was developed independently by Clarke
and Emerson [36] and by Quielle and Sifakis [66] in the early 1980s. In model
checking, a system is modeled as a set of states together with a set of transitions
between states that represents how the system behavior evolves from one state to
another over time, in response to internal and external stimulus. Model checking
tools allow automatic veriﬁcation of properties expressed in some temporal logic. In
6













No + counter Example
Figure 1.1: Model-checking method
Just like other veriﬁcation techniques, model checking also has its own advan-
tages and disadvantages. Model checker has two important advantages. First, model
checking is fully automatic. Once the correct design of the system and the required
properties has been fed in, it requires no further information or interaction from the
user. Second, if the property fail to hold, the veriﬁcation process is able to produce
a counter-example (i.e. an instance of the behavior of the system that violates the
property) which is extremely useful in helping the human designers pinpoint and ﬁx
the ﬂaw. On the other hand, model checkers are unable to handle very large designs
due to the state space explosion problem [36]. Another drawback is the problematic
description of speciﬁcations as properties, this description sometimes may not give
full system coverage.
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SPIN [5], SMV [4], NuSMV [2], and MDG tool [77] are some of the commonly
used model checking tools. They take as input, design description in a structural
form along with system speciﬁcations or properties described in an appropriate
temporal logic, and automatically check to see whether the system satisﬁes the
property.
Since the model is usually a ﬁnite-state transition system, the problem of
model checking is considered to be decidable. The design or model is formalized in
terms of a state machine (Transition System), or a Kripke [49] structure:
M = (P, S, I, R, L)
where M is a state machine (model) with transitions to describe the circuit behavior,
P is a set of atomic propositions, S is a ﬁnite set of states, I ⊆ S is a set of initial
states, R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation that must be total (i.e. for every s ∈ S
there exists s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′ ∈ R)), and L : S → 2P maps each state to the
set of atomic propositions true in that state.
The property φ is formalized as a logical formula that the machine should
satisfy. The veriﬁcation problem is stated as checking the formula φ in the model
M :
M  φ
If the model M is represented as a transition relation, then the size of the model is
limited to the number of states that can be stored in the computer memory. This
is about a few million states with the current state-of-the-art technology. Recently,
the use of eﬃcient state representations and manipulations using BDDs and/or SAT
solving techniques has increased the size of problems that can be handled with model
checking techniques by an order of magnitude.
An alternate approach based on a new class of decision graphs known as the
Multiway Decision Graph (MDG) was proposed by Cerny et al. in 1997 [30]. This
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approach is capable of dealing with the state-space explosion problem very eﬀec-
tively. In MDG based model checking, data signals are denoted by abstract vari-
ables, and data operators are represented by uninterpreted function symbols. As
a result, a veriﬁcation based on abstract-implicit-state-enumeration can be carried
out independently of data path width. This results in a substantial reduction of the
state space size. Table 1.2 shows [11] the abstraction level of MDG corresponding
to traditional methods. A model-checking methodology typically consists of three
major parts: a speciﬁcation language, a system modeling language and a set of algo-
rithms to perform model-checking. In existing MDG methodology, these are LMDG
[77], MDG-HDL [79] and MDG-tool [77, 78] respectively.
Table 1.2: Raising the abstraction level
Conventional method Multiway Decision Graph
ROBDD [21] MDG
Finite State Machine Abstract State Machine
Implicit state enumeration [26] Abstract state implicit enumeration of ASM
CTL based model-checking Subset of ﬁrst-order abstract CTL
1.3 Thesis Contribution
A desirable approach is to develop synergies between various veriﬁcation method-
ologies, and between design and veriﬁcation, in order to overcome the limitations
and to enhance the capabilities of each and our work is motivated by this goal.
Traditional invariant checking using MDG tool is the direct use of MDG reacha-
bility analysis algorithm [79]. We propose a new invariant checking methodology
integrating SAT with MDG. SAT has already been integrated with MDG tool as
a reduction engine [9]. In our work, we integrate SAT as a veriﬁcation engine, to
enhance the performance of invariant checking. Our study and implementation of
9
the methodology suggest a new veriﬁcation tool combining the strengths of both:
MDG and SAT. In terms of reviews of related work, proposed methodology and
discussions, we believe our contribution can be speciﬁed as:
• We proposed a SAT based invariant checking methodology. For the complete-
ness of the methodology:
1. We implemented a Preprocessor, an automated uninterpreted function
removal method to impose Boolean encoding on Directed Formula (DF)
with adequate encoding constraints.
2. An Encoder is also implemented to apply a linear CNF conversion al-
gorithm on a Boolean Directed Formula. The Encoder also generates a
correctness formula to be fed to a SAT solver.
• We proposed a technique to formally verify the correctness of CNF conversion
Directed Formula and also implemented a goal generator that takes the input
from the Preprocessor and generates a goal. Later on, an automated call to
the HOL [57] theorem prover is placed to check the goal.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as bellow:
• In Chapter 2, we present some of the related work in the area of Equality with
Uninterpreted function removal, diﬀerent CNF conversion algorithms and also
some SAT based Veriﬁcation approaches.
• In Chapter 3, we review the basics of temporal logic and speciﬁcation, the
structure of Multiway Decision Graph (MDG), MDG-tool followed by MDG
model checking approach. Some basic review on Boolean SAT solvers, HOL
theorem prover and normal forms concludes the chapter.
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• In Chapter 4, we propose our methodology to integrate SAT with MDG and
provide step by step description of the methodology. Also we present the
methodology to formally verify the correctness of the CNF conversion algo-
rithm.
• In Chapter 5, we present some experimental results showing the correctness of
our conversion-veriﬁcation approach. Also we present the case study, to show
the eﬃciency of our proposed SAT-MDG invariant checking methodology.





In this Chapter, we present some related research work in the area of SAT based
veriﬁcation. We divide the related works in three diﬀerent categories. The ﬁrst
category focuses on diﬀerent techniques to translate the formulas in Equality with
Uninterpreted Functions(EUF) to propositional logic. The second category describes
several algorithms for the conversion of propositional formula to CNF. In last and
ﬁnal category we discuss some related SAT based veriﬁcation techniques.
2.1 EUF Elimination
Their exist two possible ways to eliminate EUFs [69], while enforcing their prop-
erty of functional consistency, Ackermann constraints [12] and nested If-Then-Else
operators (ITE) [67, 74]. In Ackermann’s approach, the UF was replaced with a
new term variable and the next application of UF with respect to the previous one
was enforced by extending the resulting formula with constraints. Such constraints
added for each pair of applications of that UF. Bryant and Velev presented an ap-
proach to eliminate the applications of UF with nested ITEs in [67]. In nested
ITE scheme, the ﬁrst application of the UF is still replaced by a new term variable.
However the subsequent applications are eliminated by introducing nested ITEs with
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new term variables while preserving functional consistency. We prefer nested ITE
scheme which directly captures the functional consistency and readily exploit the
maximal diversity property while Ackermann’s can not [67]. For our methodology,
we use the nested-ITE approach. However we add few small modiﬁcations to match
the MDG directed formula syntax.
2.2 CNF Conversion
Lack of fast and eﬃcient CNF generation algorithm has always been a bottle neck for
CNF based SAT solvers. Hence researchers paid much attention to this point. Until
recently [20], most of the CNF generation algorithms used in practice were minor
variations of Tseitin linear time algorithm [73]. Another CNF conversion algorithm
came from Velve [75] showing an eﬃcient CNF generation technique with identifying
gates with fan-out count of 1 and merging them with their fan-out gate to generate
single set of equivalent CNF clauses. Nested ITE chains where each ITE is used
only as else argument of the next ITE are similarly merged and represented with a
single set of clauses without introducing intermediate variables. Such approach is
good for pipelined machine veriﬁcation problems, identifying certain patterns aris-
ing in formulas. Another approach for CNF generation is based on technological
mapping [32] and its implemented in ABC [72]. This algorithm computes the map-
ping sequence, partial functions from And-Inverter-Graph (AIG)[16] nodes in order
to cut of the graph for minimization of the heuristics cost function. CNF is then
generated for the cuts of the nodes with respect to the ﬁnal mapping by using their
sum of products representation. Very recently an algorithm was presented [23] for
converting Negation, ITE, Conjunction and Equivalence (NICE dags) to CNF. A
new data structure called NICE dag subsume AIGs.
All the approaches described above use an intermediate representation or data
structure for the boolean formula (either RBC, AIGER or NICE dag). The MDG
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DF is itself a DAG, so intermediate DAG representation is not required to facilitate
the conversion. The most interesting thing we observed is in most of the papers
a ”paper and pencil” sketch was given for the proof of their conversion approach.
This motivated us to build an automated tool for the veriﬁcation of conversion as
well.
2.3 SAT and BDD Based Veriﬁcation
Most of the eﬀorts today are spent on developing Satisﬁability Checking (SAT) based
tools to perform several forms of model checking as they are less sensitive to the
problem size and the state explosion problem of classical Binary Decision Diagram
(BDD) based model checkers. As a result, many researchers have developed routines
for performing Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [40][71] using SAT.
BDD and SAT based veriﬁcation have been a major ﬁeld of interest for re-
searchers for a long time. Given that both techniques perform an implicit search in
the underlaying Boolean space, it is no surprise that diﬀerent approaches have been
explored recently to combine both of them for target applications. Their beneﬁts
have been combined in many applications such as BMC[41, 8] and model checking
[46]. In [47], the authors used BDDs to represent state sets, and a CNF formula to
represent the transition relation. All valid next state combinations are enumerated
using a backtracking search algorithm for SAT that exhaustively visits the entire
space of primary input, present state and next state variables. However, rather than
using SAT to enumerate each solution all the way down to a leaf, they invoked BDD-
based image computation at intermediate points within the SAT decision procedure,
which eﬀectively obtains all solutions below that point in the search tree. In a sense,
their approach can be regarded as SAT providing a disjunctive decomposition of the
image computation into many subproblems, each of which is handled in the standard
way using BDDs. Model checking techniques for security protocol analysis based on
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reduction to Boolean logic has been explained in [15]. The main idea was, given a
protocol description in multi-set formalism and an integer k, to build propositional
formulas whose models correspond to attacks on the protocol. Propositional formu-
las are checked for satisﬁability to indicate an attack on the protocol. For checking
invariant properties of the form AGp (p is globally true along all paths) of transi-
tion systems using Induction [29], Deharbe and Moreira modiﬁed a standard model
checking algorithm. Set of states and image computation are expressed using BDD.
Velev presented an indirect method to automatically prove the safety and liveness
of a pipelined microprocessor. The term-level simulator TLSim [76], used for the
symbolic simulation of the implementation and speciﬁcation and a EUFM correct-
ness formula is produced. The decision procedure EVC [76] exploits the positive
equality, performs some other optimizations and converts the EUFM formula to an
equivalent. An eﬃcient SAT solver proves the formula to be a tautology in order for
the implementation to be correct. In [70], A safety property checking technique of
ﬁnite state machines using SAT solver was presented. Their approach demonstrates
the practicality of combining a SAT-solver based safety property checking of in a
real design ﬂow using induction. All the works described above relies on BDD based
state encoding,which suﬀers from state explosion for larger designs. In our case, We
use MDG to encode the set of sates to get rid of the state explosion problem.
SAT and MDG integration was proposed in [9], while using SAT solver as a
reduction engine. On the other hand, our proposed SAT based invariant checking
methodology for MDG model, uses a SAT solver as a veriﬁcation engine. More-
over, we implemented SAT encoding technique (CNF conversion) for MDG Direct
formula (DF) and proposed another automated methodology to formally verify the
correctness of the conversion. For the conversion part, we use Tseitin [73] approach
while introducing ”fresh variables” only for AND gates and for the veriﬁcation part
we use the HOL [57] theorem prover. Implementation of SAT for model checking
with Multiway Decision Graph (MDG) distinguishes our approach from others.
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In this Chapter, we presented some of the works related to uninterpreted
function removal, diﬀerent techniques of CNF conversion followed by some works
related to SAT based veriﬁcation. Also, we also mentioned how our work diﬀers





In this chapter, we give a brief introduction to the Temporal Logic, Multiway De-
cision Graphs (MDGs) with MDG tool, followed by some basics of Boolean SAT
solvers, the HOL theorem prover and normal forms. The intent is to familiarize the
reader with the main concepts and notations that are used in the rest of the thesis.
Section 3.1 presents temporal logic and how they are speciﬁed with LTL, CTL and
CTL*. Section 3.2 describes the underlying formal logic of MDGs, the Abstract
State Machine (ASM) and the MDGs structure. Introduction to MDG tool, MDG
model checker and invariant speciﬁcation in MDG tool is described in Section 3.3. A
brief introduction to SAT solver and SAT solving algorithm is described in Section
3.4. Section 3.5 starts by a basic description of higher-order logic concepts as well as
the proof methods supported by the HOL theorem prover. We conclude the chapter
in Section 3.6 describing the basic format of Conjunctive Normal Form(CNF) and
Disjunctive Normal Form(DNF).
3.1 Temporal Logic and Speciﬁcation
Desired speciﬁcations in model checking methods, are usually written in proposi-
tional temporal logic formulae [65]. This allows the user to write propositions with
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respect to time. The model of time is represented either in linear time (LTL) [55, 48]
or branching time (CTL) [24]. A logic that combines the expressive power of LTL
and CTL is known as CTL* which is also known as full branching-time logic.
3.1.1 Linear Time Logic
The structure of time in linear time logic, is a totally ordered set (S,<), isomorphic
to the set of natural numbers (N,<) [31]:
If AP is a set of atomic propositions, a linear time structure is deﬁned as M(S, x, L),
where:
• S is a set of states;
• x : N → S is an inﬁnite sequences of states;
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling of each state with the set of atomic propositions in
AP at the state.
Following is an example (Fig. 3.1):
Model M(S, x, L)
x:
S = { s0, s1, s2, …}
p p q r u
s0 s1 s2
AP = {p, q, r, u, v}
L(s0) = {p}, L(s1) = {p, q},  L(s2) = {r, u}, … 
. . .
Figure 3.1: Model Structure
In propositional linear temporal logic (PLTL), one can use propositional logic
as building block and apply temporal operators to specify properties. The PLTL
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syntax is deﬁned as a least set of formulae generated by the following rules [31]:
1. Each atomic proposition is a formula;
2. If p and q are formulae then ¬p and p ∧ q are formulae;
3. If p and q are formulae then pUq and Xp are formulae.
The semantics of a formula p of PLTL with respect to a linear-time structure
M(S, x, L) is deﬁned below. Here, we write M,x |= p iﬀ p ∈ L(s0) for atomic
proposition p to mean that in structure M formula p is true on timeline
x; xi denotes the suﬃx path si, si+1, si+2, and so forth.
1. M,x |= p iff p ∈ L(s0).
2. M,x |= ¬p iff not M,x |= p.
3. M,x |= {p ∧ q} iff M,x |= p and M,x |= q.
4. M,x |= Xp iff M,x1 |= p.
5. M,x |= p U q iff ∀j(M,xi |= q, and ∀0<i<j(M,xk |= p)).
6. M,x |= Fp iff ∃j(M,xj |= p).
7. M,x |= Gp iff ∀j(M,xj |= p).
A PLTL formula p is satisﬁable iff there exists a linear-time structure M =
(S, x, L) such that M,x |= p, and any such structure deﬁnes a model of p.





p p p p
p p p q
Figure 3.2: LTL formulae and time.
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3.1.2 Computation Tree Logic
Computation tree logic (CTL) is based on branching time temporal logic (BTTL).
It was ﬁrst proposed by Clarke and Emerson [35]. In CTL, the time is modeled as a
branching tree-like structure where each moment may have many diﬀerent successor
moments. Along each path, the timeline is isomorphic to the natural number. To
specify a property in CTL, we simply apply the path operators along with temporal
operators to the propositional building blocks. There are two strict restrictions in
CTL:
1. Only single linear time operator F, G, X or U can follow a path quantiﬁer;
2. Time operators cannot be combined directly with the propositional connec-
tives.
The syntax of CTL is governed by the following rules:
1. Every proposition is a CTL formula;
2. If p and q are CTL formula, then so are p, (p∧q), AXp, EXp, A(pUq), E(pUq).
The remaining operators can be derived from the above rules. The truth of a formula
is determined on a given state and not on a branch of the time structure. The
structure resembles an inﬁnite computation tree. A temporal formula p is satisﬁed
by a model M with transitions T, if it is true for all the initial states s0 of the model.
The semantics of CTL formula is given below:
1. M, s0 |= p iﬀ p ∈ L(s0).
2. M, s0 |= ¬p iﬀ not M, s0 |= p.
3. M, s0 |= {p ∧ q} iﬀ M, s0 |= p and M, s0 |= q.
4. M, s0 |= AXp iﬀ for all states s′0 with (s0, s′0) ∈ T , M, s′0 |= p.
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5. M, s0 |= EXp iﬀ for some state s′0 with (s0, s′0) ∈ T , M, s′0 |= p.
6. M, s0 |= A(pUq) iﬀ for all paths (s0, s1, . . . ), there exists a j > 0 with M, sj |=
q, and M, si |= p holds ∀0 ≤ i < j.
7. M, s0 |= E(pUq) iﬀ for some path (s0, s1, . . . ), there exists a j > 0 with M, sj |=
q, and M, si |= p holds ∀0 ≤ i < j.
Figure 3.3 shows intuitive meanings of some CTL formulae.










f f f f f
AXf EXf
f f f f
Figure 3.3: CTL formulae and time.
3.1.3 Full Branching-time Logic
Full branching-time logic is the class of logic formulas that combines the branching-
time and linear-time operators. In CTL*, a path quantiﬁer can be a preﬁx to an
assertion composed of arbitrary combination of the temporal operators: F, G, X and
U. Like CTL, the tree is formed by designating an initial state s0 in model M, and
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then unwinding the structure into an inﬁnite tree with s0 as the root. The semantics
of the path quantiﬁers and temporal operators remain the same.
3.1.4 Categories of Speciﬁcation
The speciﬁcations are written as properties of the system. They are categorized as
follows:
1. Safety property – ensures that nothing ‘bad’ will ever happen. A temporal logic
formula is a safety property if it can be written as AGϕ(in CTL or CTL*) or
Gφ(in PLTL), where ϕ is a propositional frormula.
2. Liveness property – ensures that something ‘good’ will eventually happen.
Depicted as |= Fp or |= AFp, where p will eventually be true at some point in
the future.
3. Precedence property – ensures precedence order of events. Depicted as |= pUq,
where q is true in present time or p is true until q becomes true.
Among the three, safety property is the most used when writing speciﬁcations of a
design under veriﬁcation.
3.2 Multiway Decision Graph
3.2.1 Abstract State Machine
In MDG, a state machine is described using ﬁnite sets of input, state and output
variables, which are pair-wise disjoint. The behavior of a state machine is deﬁned by
its transition/output relations including a set of reset states. An abstract descrip-
tion of the state machine, called Abstract State Machine (ASM) [37], is obtained
by letting some data input, state or output variables be of an abstract sort, and
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the datapath operations be uninterpreted function symbols. As ROBDDs are used
to represent sets of states and transition/output relations for ﬁnite state machines
(FSM), MDGs are used to compactly encode sets of (abstract) states and transi-
tion/output relations for ASMs. This technique replaces the implicit enumeration
technique[27] with the implicit abstract enumeration [25].
3.2.2 Structure
MDGs are graph representation of a class of quantiﬁer-free and negation-free ﬁrst-
order many sorted formulae. It subsumes the class of Bryant’s (ROBDDs) [19]
while accommodating abstract data and Uninterpreted Function symbols. MDG
can be seen as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with one root, whose leaves are
labeled by formulae of the logic True (T) [25], such that:
1. Every leaf node is labeled by the formula T, except if the graph G has a single
node, which may be labeled Tor F.
2. The internal nodes are labeled by terms, and the edges issuing from an internal
node v are labeled by terms of the same sort as the label of v.
Following is an example: Let graph G represent Boolean formula(¬x∧F0)∨(x∧F1),
Where, F0 and F1 are the Boolean formulas represented by the sub-graphs G0 and
G1 respectively. In many sorted ﬁrst-order logic the graph G can be viewed as
representing a formula: ((x = 0) ∧ F0) ∨ (x = 1) ∧ F1)).
Three possible generalizations of G and the corresponding formulas are shown in
(Fig. 3.4. F0, F1 and F2 are ﬁrst-order formulas represented by the sub-graphs G0,
G1 and G2 respectively:
1. From G to G
′
: x ∈ {0, 1} → x ∈ {0, 2, 3}, and Graph G′ represents the
formula
((x = 0) ∧ F0) ∨ ((x = 2) ∧ F1) ∨ ((x = 3) ∧ F2).
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2. From G to G
′′
: x ∈ {0, 1} → x ∈ {a, y, f(a, y)}, and Graph G′′ represents the
formula
((x = a) ∧ F0) ∨ ((x = y) ∧ F1) ∨ ((x = f(a, y)) ∧ F2).
3. From G to G
′′′
: x ∈ {0, 1} → g(x) ∈ {0, 2, 3}, and Graph G′′′ represents the
formula
((g(x) = 0) ∧ F0) ∨ ((g(x) = 2) ∧ F1) ∨ ((g(x) = 3) ∧ F2).
XBoolean variable
G:




Sort    :[0,1,2,3,4] D
G0 G1 G2
Concrete variable of D
0
2
3 Individual constant of D
X
G0 G1 G2




Cross operator of D












Figure 3.4: BDDs to MDGs.






are examples of Multiway
Decision Graphs (MDGs).
As in ordinary many-sorted First Order Logic (FOL), terms are made out of
sorts, constants, variables, and function symbols. Two kinds of sorts are distin-
guished: concrete and abstract. Concrete sort is equipped with ﬁnite enumerations,
lists of individual constants. Concrete sorts are used to represent control signals.
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Abstract sort has no enumeration available and represents a data signal. MDGs
represent and manipulate a certain subset of ﬁrst order formulae, which we call
Directed Formulae (DFs).
Sort S ::= S | S
Abstract Sort S ::= α | β | γ | · · ·
Concrete Sort S ::= α | β | γ | · · ·
Generic Constant C ::= a | b | c | · · ·
Concrete Constant C ::= a | b | c | · · ·
Variable X ::= V | V
Abstract Variable V ::= x | y | z | · · ·
Concrete Variable V ::= x | y | z | · · ·
Directed Formulae DF ::= Disj |  | ⊥
Disj ::= Conj ∨Disj | Conj
Conj ::= Eq ∧ Conj | Eq
Eq ::= A = C(A ∈ T (F , V ))
|V = C
|V = A(A ∈ T (F ,X ))
Let F be a set of function symbols and V a set of variables. We denote the set of
terms freely generated from F and V by T (F ,V). The syntax of a Directed Formula
is given by the grammar given above. [13]. The underline is used to diﬀerentiate
between the concrete and abstract variables.
The vocabulary consists of generic constants, concrete constants (individuals),
abstract variables, concrete variables and function symbols. DFs are always disjunc-
tions of conjunctions of equations or  (true) or ⊥ (false). The conjunction Conj
is deﬁned to be an equation only (Eq) or a conjunction of at least two equations.
Atomic formulae are the equations, generated by the clause Eq. An equation can be
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an equality of concrete terms and an individual constant, equality of a concrete vari-
able and an individual constant, or equality of an abstract variable and an abstract
term.
A directed formula DF of type U → V is a formula in Disjunctive Normal
Form (DNF) plus  (truth) and ⊥ (false), where U and V are two disjoint sets
of variables. Just as ROBDD must be reduced and ordered, MDGs must obey a
set of well-formedness conditions given in [25]. DFs are used for two purposes: to
represent sets (viz. sets of states as well as sets of input vectors and output vectors)
and to represent relations (viz. the transition and output relations) as well as the set
of possible initial states and the sets of states that arise during reachability analysis.
ALU: x0
y yyy









Figure 3.5: MDG of an ALU
Figure 3.5 shows MDG reforestation of a simple Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU).
Depending on the value of selection signal x0 the output value is chosen between the
addition or the subtraction of x1 and x2, increment of x1 or the output value can be
zero as well. The Directed Formula(DF) representation of the MDG is as following:
[(x0 = 0) ∧ y = zero]∨
[(x0 = 1) ∧ y = sub(x1, x2)]∨
[(x0 = 2) ∧ y = add(x1, x2)]∨
[(x0 = 3) ∧ y = inc(x1)]∨
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3.3 The MDG-Tool
The MDG-tool [79] is a well known academic tool. It supports invariant check-
ing, sequential equivalence checking, and model checking. The MDGs tool uses a
Prolog-style hardware description language called the MDG-HDL(MDG-HDL) [25].
MDG-HDL supports structural, behavioral and mixed styles of coding. A structural
speciﬁcation is usually a netlist of components connected by signals. A behavioral
description consists of a tabular representation of the transition and output relations
















Figure 3.6: The Structure of the MDGs-tool
The ﬁrst step in the veriﬁcation is to describe the design speciﬁcations and
implementations using MDG-HDL, as shown in Figure 3.6. An MDG-HDL algebraic
speciﬁcation consists of sorts, function types, and generic constants. Rewrite rules
needed for interpreting function symbols are also provided. Symbol ordering (like
for ROBDD) can either be speciﬁed by the user, or can be dynamically generated
by the MGD tool. Symbol ordering can critically aﬀect the size of the generated
MDGs and the performance of the veriﬁcation.
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3.3.1 MDGs Model Checking
The MDGs model checking is based on an abstract implicit state enumeration. The
circuit under veriﬁcation is expressed as an Abstract State Machine (ASM) and the
properties to be veriﬁed are expressed as formulae in LMDG [77, 11]. The ASM
description of the digital systems is at a higher level of abstraction. LMDG atomic
formulae are Boolean constants (True and False), or equations of the form (t1 = t2),
where t1 is an ASM variable (input, output or state variable) and t2 is either an
ASM system variable, an individual constant, an ordinary variable or a function
of ordinary variables. Ordinary variables are deﬁned to memorize the values of
the system variables in the current state. The basic Next let formulas contain
temporal operator X (next time) is deﬁned follows [13]:
• Each atomic formula is a Next let formula;
• If p, q are Next let formulas, then so are: !p (not p), p&q (p and q), p|q (p
or q), p → q (p implies q), Xp (next-time p) and LET (v=t) IN p, where t is
a system variable and v an ordinary variable.
Using the temporal operators AG (always), AF (eventually) and AU (until),
the supported LMDG properties are deﬁned in the following BNF grammar:
Property ::= A(Next let formula)
|AG(Next let formula)
|AF (Next let formula)
|A(Next let formula)U (Next let formula)
|AG(Next let formula)⇒ F (Next let formula)
|AG((Next let formula)⇒
((Next let formula)U Next let formula)))
Model checking in MDGs is carried out by automatically building additional
circuits that represent the Next let formulas appearing in the property to be veriﬁed,
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composing it with the original circuit, and then checking a simpler property on the
composite machine [77].
3.3.2 Invariant Speciﬁcation in MDG
An invariant ﬁle speciﬁes the invariant condition to be checked during reachability
analysis[79]. An invariant condition can be speciﬁed by a combinational circuit
whose output signals are named by the variables that occur in the condition. By
convention, an assignment of values to those variables satisﬁes the condition iﬀ
the outputs of the combinational circuit take those values for some assignment of
values to the inputs. An MDG representing the invariant is obtained from the
MDG representing the functionality of the combinational circuit by existentially
quantifying the concrete inputs. The variables representing abstract inputs are left
in the graph as implicitly quantiﬁed secondary variables [82].
For example, for the equivalence checking of two ASMs, we need to specify
the equality of two corresponding signals as the invariant. This is expressed by
the simple fork as shown in Figure 3.7 (a). The fork may yield diﬀerent MDGs
depending on the sort of the signals. If u, x and y are of the Boolean sort, then u is
existentially quantiﬁed and we get the MDG as shown in Figure 3.7 (b) which simply
represents x = y. If x and y are of an abstract sort, then we get an MDG as shown in
Figure 3.7 (c) which represents the formula (x = u)∧ (y = u). Taking the secondary
variable u to be existentially quantiﬁed, the invariant is ∃u((x = u) ∧ (y = u)),
which is logically equivalent to x = y.
This combinational circuit is described completely in this invariant speciﬁca-
tion ﬁle, including the following predicates: signal/2, component/2, outputs/1 and
order cond/1 which gives the node order for the variables and the cross-function
symbols appeared in the circuit.
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Figure 3.7: Invariant speciﬁcation in MDG tool
3.4 Boolean Satisﬁability
The Boolean Satisﬁability (SAT) problem is a well-known constraint satisfaction
problem. It has many applications in the ﬁeld of computer aided design such as
test generation, logic veriﬁcation and timing analysis. Given a Boolean formula,
the objective is to either ﬁnd a boolean assignment to the variables so that the
formula evaluates to true, or establish that such an assignment does not exist. The
Boolean formula is typically expressed in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), also
called product-of-sums form. Each sum term (clause) in the CNF is a sum of single
literals, where a literal is a variable or its negation.
Most state-of-the-art SAT solvers are based on the Davis-Putnam algorithm [28].
The basic algorithm begins from an empty assignment, and proceeds by assigning
a 0 or 1 value to a free variable at a time. After each assignment, the algorithm
determines the direct and transitive implications of that assignment on other vari-
ables. This process is sometimes also called the Boolean Constraint Propagation
(BCP). If no contradiction is detected during the implication procedure, the algo-
rithm picks the next free variable, and this process is repeated. Otherwise, the
algorithm attempts a new partial assignment by complementing the most recently
assigned variable for which only one value has been tried so far. This step is called
backtracking. The algorithm terminates either when all clauses have been satisﬁed
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and a solution has been found, or when all possible assignments have been exhausted.
The algorithm is complete in that it will ﬁnd a solution if it exists.
Algorithm 1 Davis Putnam()
1: while true do
2: if DecideNextBranch()==false then
3: return(SATISFIABLE);
4: end if
5: while Deduce()==CONFLICT do





Algorithm 1 shows the Pseudo code adapted from the basic Davis-Putnam
search procedure. The function DecideNextBranch() selects a variable that is not
currently assigned, and gives it a value. This variable assignment is referred to
as a decision. The Deduce() function carries out Boolean Constraint Propagation
(BCP). It propagates variable assignments based on the current decision. Basically,
if a clause consists of only literals with value 0 and one unassigned literal, then
that unassigned literal must take on a value of 1. Clauses in this state are said to
be unit, and this rule is referred to as the unit clause rule. In the pseudo-code,
Deduce() carries out BCP transitively until either there are no more implications
(in which case it returns SATISFIABLE) or a conﬂict is produced (in which case it
returns UNSATISFIABLE). A conﬂict occurs when implications for setting the same
variable to both 1 and 0 are produced.
Algorithm 2 ResolveConﬂict()
1: d = most recent decision not tried both ways;
2: if d == NULL then
3: return(false);
4: end if
5: flip the value of d;
6: mark d as tried both ways;
7: undo any invalidated implications;
8: return(true);
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In order to deal with a conﬂict, we can ﬂip the value of the decision assignment,
undo all the implications by the decision, and allow BCP to then proceed as normal.
If both values have already been tried for this decision, then we backtrack through
the decision stack until we encounter a decision that has not been tried both ways,
and proceed from there in the manner described in Algorithm 2.
3.5 The HOL Theorem Prover
The HOL system is an LCF [45, 11] (Logic of Computable Functions) style proof
system. It was originally intended for hardware veriﬁcation, but because of its ability
to handle a variety of applications, it is now considered a general purpose proof
system. Some of these applications include security systems, veriﬁcation of fault-
tolerant computers, compiler veriﬁcation, program reﬁnement calculus, software and
algorithms veriﬁcation, modeling, and automation theory. HOL provides a wide
range of proof commands, rewriting tools and decision procedures. The system
is user-programmable and proof tools can be developed for speciﬁc applications
without compromising reliability [44].
The set of types, type operators, constants, and axioms available in HOL are
organized in the form of theories. The theories are arranged in a hierarchy. These
theories include various formalized mathematical concepts such as lists, products,
sums, numbers, primitive recursion, and arithmetic etc. On top of these, users
are allowed to introduce application-dependent theories by adding relevant types,
constants, axioms, and deﬁnitions.
The HOL system supports higher order logic with three main expressions:
• Variables can range over functions and predicates.
• The logic is typed.
• There is no separate syntactic category of formulae.
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The basic interface to the system is a Standard Meta Language (SML) inter-
preter. SML [54] is both the implementation language of the system and the Meta
Language in which proofs are written. The HOL system supports both forward and
backward proof methods common in a natural-deduction style calculus. In the for-
ward proof method, the steps of a proof are implemented by applying inference rules
chosen by the user, and HOL checks that the steps are safe. All derived inference
rules are built on top of a small number of primitive inference rules. This approach
has some limitations since it is hard to know where to state the proof and, for large
proofs, to determine which sequence of rules to apply. The results are strong and
the user can have great conﬁdence since the most primitive rules are used to prove
a theorem. In the backward proof method, the user sets the desired theorem as
a goal. Small programs written in SML called tactics and tacticals are applied to
break the goal into a list of subgoals. Tactics and tacticals are repeatedly applied
to the subgoals until they can be resolved. In practice, forward proof is often used
within backward proof to convert each goals assumptions into a suitable form.
Theorems in the HOL system are represented by values of the ML abstract
type thm. There is no way to construct a theorem except by carrying out a proof
based on the primitive inference rules and axioms. HOL system has many built-in
inference rules and ultimately all theorems are proved in terms of these axioms and
basic inferences of the calculus. By applying a set of primitive inference rules, a
theorem can be created. Once a theorem is proved, it can be used in further proofs
without recomputation of its own proof. In this way, the ML type system protects
the HOL logic from arbitrary construction of a theorem, so that every computed
value of the type-representing theorem is a theorem. The user can have a great deal
of conﬁdence in the results of the system.
The HOL system has been used in hardware veriﬁcation, reasoning about secu-
rity, veriﬁcation of fault-tolerant computers, and reasoning about real-time systems.
It has also found application in compiler veriﬁcation, program reﬁnement calculus,
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software and algorithms veriﬁcation, modeling, and automation theory. HOL also
has a rudimentary library facility which enable theories to be shared. This provides
a ﬁle structure and documentation format for self contained HOL developments.
Many basic reasoners are given as libraries such as mesonLib, bossLib, and sim-
pLib. These libraries integrate rewriting, conversion and decision procedures and
free the user from performing low-level proof.
3.6 Normal Forms
Deﬁnition 1. A formula is in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) if it is a disjunction
of minterms (conjunctions of literals). In other words, a DNF formula is a sum of
products and looks like:
(x11 ∧ x12 ∧ ..... ∧ x1n1) ∨ (x21 ∧ ... ∧ x2n2) ∨ ...... ∨ (xm1 ∧ .... ∧ xmnm)






Deﬁnition 2. A literal L is either an atom p or the negation of an atom ¬p. A
formula C is in Conjunctive Normal Form(CNF ) if it is a conjunction of clauses,
where each clause D is a disjunction of literals:
L ::= p|¬p
D ::= L|L ∨D
C ::= D|D ∧ C
Deﬁnition 3. Given a formula φ in propositional logic, we say that φ is satisﬁable
if it has a valuation in which it evaluates to T. For example, the formula p ∨ q → p
is satisﬁable since it computes T if we assign T to p. Clearly, p ∨ q → p is not valid.
Thus, satisﬁability is a weaker concept since every valid formula is by deﬁnition also
satisﬁable but not vice versa. However, these two notions are just mirror images of
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each other, the mirror being negation.
Proposition 4. Let φ be a formula of propositional logic. Then φ is satisﬁable iﬀ
¬φ is not valid.
Proof: First, assume that φ is satisﬁable. By deﬁnition, there exists a valuation of
φ in which φ evaluates to T; but that means that ¬φ evaluates to F for that same
valuation. Thus, ¬φ cannot be valid.
Second, assume that ¬φ is not valid. Then there must be a valuation of ¬φ in
which ¬φ evaluates to F. Thus, φ evaluates to T and is therefore satisﬁable. (Note
that the valuations of are exactly the valuations of ¬φ).
This result is extremely useful since it essentially says that we need to provide
a decision procedure for only one of these concepts. For example, lets say that we
have a procedure P for deciding whether any ¬φ is valid. We obtain a decision
procedure for satisﬁability simply by asking P whether ¬φ is valid. If it is, φ is
not satisﬁable; otherwise φ is satisﬁable. Similarly, we may transform any decision
procedure for satisﬁability into one for validity.
In this Chapter, we presented some of the basics required for better under-
standing the rest of chapters of this book. We provided the basics of temporal logics,
Multiway Decision Graph, MDG tool, boolean SAT solvers as well as HOL theorem
prover. In the next chapter, we describe our proposed methodology in detail.
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Chapter 4
Integrating SAT with MDG
In this chapter, we present the proposed methodology for SAT based invariant check-
ing. SAT has already been integrated with MDG tool as a reduction engine in [9].
This chapter provides a step by step description of the complete methodology using
SAT as veriﬁcation engine with MDG.
4.1 Formalization of the Problem
Given a state machine M with initial states I and transition relation Tr, we would
like to check whether a property P holds for all the reachable states. The reachable
states are those which can be reached by Tr transitions starting from an initial
state. Let S denote the entire set of states. A system is a safe system, where all the
reachable states satisfy P .
Introduction of various type of paths through the graph of a transition relation
is required to formalize the problem more precisely. We write Tr(x, y) to indicate
that x is related to y by a transition relation Tr. We deﬁne the sequence of states






Here ”  ” sign means ”is deﬁned to be” and s[0...n] denotes a sequence of
states (set of state) e.g. s0, s1, s2....sn. A path can have a length n, if it makes n
transitions. For us, we are interested to show that, starting from the initial state
and repeated application of transition relation always leads to a state that satisﬁes
P . We want to show that,
∀i.∀s0....si.(I(s0) ∧ path(s[0...i])→ P (si))
where, i ≥ 0 and si ∈ S. Similarly, proving backward from bad states involves
showing that, starting from a state that violates P and going backwards through
Tr always leads to a non-initial state, which is
∀i.∀s0....si.¬(I(s0)← path(s[0...i]) ∧ ¬P (si))
To get a more symmetric view at the problem, we say there are no paths that
start in an initial state and end in a non-P-state, that is,
∀i.∀s0....si.¬(I(s0) ∧ path(s[0...i]) ∧ ¬P (si))
4.2 Proposed Methodology
We propose a methodology (Figure 4.1) to formulate and verify a formula (we call
this formula Correctness formula), to check the safety of a system or design. In our
methodology, we are interested to check if the formula,
∀i.∀s0....si.¬(I(s0) ∧ path(s[0...i]) ∧ ¬P (si))
holds for i = 0, i = 1, i = 2 and so on. It is similar to check I(s0) ∧ path(s[0...i]) ∧
¬P (si) is a contradiction for each i, for s0 to si; i.e. ¬(I(s0)∧path(s[0...i])∧¬P (si))
is a tautology. If the property P is violated in a reachable state, then, ∃i.I(s0) ∧















Figure 4.1: Veriﬁcation Methodology using MDG tool and SAT solver
of length i starting from initial states that violates P and it can be used for tracing
errors.
Automation of this approach with MDG involves four main tasks:
• Compute the reachable states, starting from the initial state. It will give us the
path by which each possible reachable state can be reached, by each transition,
until all the reachable states have been visited.
• The reachable states are computed in Directed Formula format. Removal of
Uninterpreted functions and introduction of boolean encoding is required to
convert the formula suitable for boolean SAT solvers.
• Perform the CNF conversion of the boolean formula using a linear algorithm
to avoid exponential blow up (direct conversion from DNF to CNF has expo-
nential blow up).
• Fed the formula to a SAT solver to check the satisﬁability.
Using SAT solver with MDG tool is a new and eﬃcient approach for invariant
checking. The steps in the methodology are as following:
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1. We use MDG tool to compute the sets of reachable states for the given MDG
model (behavioral/RTL) written in MDG-HDL language. Any other imple-
mentation of MDG reachability analysis algorithm can be used instead of MDG
tool. We conjunct all the sets of states which gives us the a set Sreachable con-
sisting of all the reachable states for the system in DF format.
2. Boolean Encoding is imposed by the preprocessor to reduce the DF in propo-
sitional logic. After removal of uninterpreted functions the encoder generates
a pure boolean formula DFbool with certain encoding constraints.
3. We get formula BDF after conjunction of DFbool with Encoding constrains and
negated invariant property.
4. The BDF is converted into CNF using Tseitin algorithm. The output is SAT
encoded CNF formula in DIMACS [3] format. At this stage we call this formula
Correctness Formula.
5. The SAT encoded correctness formula is fed to a SAT solver to prove ¬(Sreachable∧
¬P∧constraints) a tautology or (Sreachable∧¬P∧constraints) is a contradiction.
Detail description of these steps is explained in the following subsections.
4.2.1 Using MDG for Reachibility Analysis
The presence of uninterpreted symbols in the logic means that we must distinguish
between a state machine M and its abstract description D in the logic. This is called
Abstract State Machine, a state machine given an abstract description in terms of
DFs, or equivalently MDGs, as deﬁned in [25, 11].
Deﬁnition 1. An Abstract Description of a State Machine (ASM) M is a tuple
D = (X, Y, Z, Y ′, IS, T r, Or), where:
• X : ﬁnite set of input variables,
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• Y : ﬁnite set of state variables,
• Z : ﬁnite set of output variables,
• IS : MDG of type U0 → Y , where U0 is a set of disjoint abstract variables, IS
is the abstract description of the set of initial states,
• Tr : MDG of type X∪Y → Y ′. Tr is the abstract description of the transition
relation,
• Or : MDG of type X ∪ Y → Z. Or is the abstract description of the output
relation.
Algorithm 3 shows how the analysis of the reachable states of M is performed based
on the abstract description D.
Algorithm 3 MDG Reachibility Analysis
1: R := IS;
2: Q := IS;
3: i := 0;
4: while Q = F do
5: i := i+ 1;
6: IN := new inputs(i); – Produce new inputs
7: NS := next states(IN,Q, T r); – Compute next state
8: Q := frontier(NS,R); – Set difference
9: R := union(R,Q); – – Merge with set of states reached previously
10: end while
The algorithm is initialized by the construction of the initial MDG structure
in Lines 1-3. In line 4-10, within the while loop, the set of reachable states is com-
puted. When the frontier set (Q) becomes empty (F), the while loop terminates.
A new MDG input is produced in line 6. In line 7, Next state is computed by the
function next state using the RelP operation, that takes the MDGs representing the
set of inputs, the current state and the transition relation as assignment, respec-
tively. In line 8, The function frontier, computes the set diﬀerence using the PbyS
operation, that approximates the set diﬀerence between the newly reachable state
in the current iteration from the reachable state in the ﬁrst iteration. Finally, the
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set of all reachable states so far is computed, in line 9. The MDG tool applies the
reachibility algorithm[10] and gives all the possible sets of reachable states in terms
of DF. We conjunct initial state with frontier sets and output relations computed
by MDG tool for each transitions to construct the complete DF, representing all the
sets of reachable states e.g. DFcomplete = DF0∧DF1∧DF2∧DF3......∧DFn. Here n
is the number of transitions the reachibility analysis algorithm needs to terminate.
DF0 indicates initial state and rest of the each DF is the conjunction of frontier
sets and outputs relations.
4.2.2 Preprocessing to Impose Boolean Encoding
The naive structure of DF contains Uninterpreted Functions and predicates. We
convert the DF formula to a boolean formula. The preprocessor eliminates the
EUF applications and introduces boolean encoding with adequate constraints. We
describe step by step procedure in the following subsections.
Boolean Encoding for Clauses with Constraints
Consider a directed formula (r = 0) ∧ (f = 1) ∨ (r = 1) ∧ (f = 0). We introduce
Boolean variables r0, f1, r1 and f0 respectively for abstracting the clause (r =
0), (f = 1), (r = 1) and (f = 0). Constraints are introduced at the same time.
For this example, we know that (r = 0) and (r = 1) can not be true at the same
time. Meanwhile one of them must be true, forcing them to be mutually exclusive,
otherwise the equation will not be satisﬁable. A similar constraint is also applicable
to (f = 0) and (f = 1). So, after reduction to propositional logic the directed
formula looks like:
(r0) ∧ (f1) ∨ (r1) ∧ (f0)
The constraints for the above example are: r0 ⊕ r1 and f0 ⊕ f1
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EUF Elimination
The logic of Equality with Uninterpreted Functions (EUF) was ﬁrst presented by
Burch and Dill [22]. The syntax of EUF logic in directed formula is given in [13].
Our EUF elimination approach is inspired by using nested ITEs [67]. We intro-
duce domain variables replacing each function application term with a nested ITE
structure that directly holds the functional consistency. For example, if g(x1, y1),
g(x2, y2) and g(x3, y3) are three applications of UF g(), then the ﬁrst application
will be eliminated by a new term variable c1. The second one will be replaced by
ITE((x2 = x1) ∧ (y2 = y1), c1, c2), where c2 is a new term variable. The third one
will be replaced by ITE((x3 = x1)∧(y3 = y1), c1, ITE((x3 = x2)∧(y3 = y2), c2, c3)),
where c3 is a new term variable.
For ITE terms, we deﬁne encITE as:
encTr(ITE(G, T1, T2)) = encDF (G) ∧ encTr(T1) ∨ ¬encDF (G) ∧ encTr(T2)
where encTr(T1) and encTr(T2) represent Boolean encoded terms and encDF (G)
represents an encoded propositional of formula G. For some cases, we modiﬁed
Bryant’s encoding slightly for the MDG DF case. For example, if the formula inside
ITE contains a comparison between two diﬀerent constants (such cases sometime
occurs in MDG DF), then it is always false. So, we deﬁne the encoding for such
cases as:
encTr(ITE(Gconst1=const2, T1, T2)) = encTr(T2)
The Min-Max example
For the illustration of EUF elimination approach, we consider the MIN-MAX circuit
described in [25, 11]. Figure 4.2 represents the MIN-MAX state machine which has
two input variables, X = {r; x} and three state variables Y = {c;m;M}, where r
and c belongs to the Boolean sort B, a concrete sort with enumeration {0; 1}, and x,
m, and M are of an abstract sort s. The outputs coincide with the state variables,
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which means, all the state variables are observable and therefore no additional output
variables is introduced.
The transition labels denote the conditions under which each transition can
be taken and an assignment of values to the abstract next state variables n m and
n M . The machine stores in m and M , respectively. m and M are the smallest and
the greatest values respectively, presented at the input x since the last reset (r = 1).
m is loaded by the maximal possible value max and M by the minimal possible
value min, if the machine is reset. The min and max symbols are uninterpreted
generic constants of sort s. An operator leq Fun computes the smallest and greatest
values, such that for any two values p and q of sort s, leq Fun(p, q) = 1 if and only
if p is less than or equal to q. The transition relation can be described by a set
of individual transition relations, one related with each next state variable. The
directed formulas of these individual transition relations, for a particular custom
symbol order, are stated below:
Tr c = [((r = 0) ∧ (n c = 0))∨
((r = 1) ∧ (n c = 1))]
Tr m = [((r = 0) ∧ (c = 0) ∧ (n m = m) ∧ (leq Fun(x,m) = 0))∨
((r = 0) ∧ (c = 0) ∧ (n m = x) ∧ (leq Fun(x,m) = 1))∨
((r = 0) ∧ (c = 1) ∧ (n m = x))∨






{n_m =if leq_Fun(x,m ) 
then x else m ,
n_M =if leq_Fun(x,M ) 
then M  else x}
r=1, {n_m =m ax, n_M =m in}
r=0, {n_m =x, n_M =x}
Figure 4.2: MIN-MAX State Machine
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Tr M = [((r = 0) ∧ (c = 0) ∧ (n M = x) ∧ (leq Fun(x,M) = 0))∨
((r = 0) ∧ (c = 0) ∧ (n M = M) ∧ (leq Fun(x,M) = 1))∨
((r = 0) ∧ (c = 1) ∧ (n M = x))∨
((r = 1) ∧ (n M = min))]
The conjunction of these individual transition relations represents the DF of the
system transition relation Tr. We illustrate with this example, how we reduce this
directed formula to propositional logic. We consider the Directed formula describing
the transition relations. Directed formula representing the set of states can be
reduced to propositional logic in the same way. We have two appearance of same
function symbol with diﬀerent arguments. We deﬁne two term variables U1 and U2
for these terms. But we are not imposing ITE chain here, because M and m are
constants, so (m = M) is always false. So we are introducing a new domain variable
for both the cases:
U1 = leq fun(x,m) = uf1
U2 = leq fun(x,M) = uf2
We should introduce some constraint to establish a relation between uf1 and uf2.
For this case:
uf1⇒ uf2
= ¬uf1 ∨ uf2
We replace the UF application and introduce boolean variables for the rest of the
terms. After replacing all the terms with boolean variables we get an equivalent
boolean formula:
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Tr c = [((r0) ∧ (nc0))∨
((r1) ∧ (nc1))]
Constraints = r0⊕ r1
nc0⊕ nc1
Tr m = [((r0) ∧ (c0) ∧ (nm eq m) ∧ (uf1 eq 0))∨
((r0) ∧ (c0) ∧ (nm eq x) ∧ (uf1 eq 1))∨
((r0) ∧ (c1) ∧ (nm eq x))∨
((r1) ∧ (nm eq max))]
Constraints = r0⊕ r1
nc0⊕ nc1
nm eq x⊕ nm eq m
uf1 eq 0⊕ uf1 eq 1
Tr M = [((r0) ∧ (c0) ∧ (nM eq x) ∧ (uf2 eq 0))∨
((r0) ∧ (c0) ∧ (nM eq M) ∧ (uf2 eq 1)∨
((r0) ∧ (c1) ∧ (nM eq x))∨
((r1) ∧ (nM eq min))]
Constraints = r0⊕ r1
nc0⊕ nc1
nM eq x⊕ nM eq M
uf2 eq 0⊕ uf2 eq 1
4.2.3 CNF Conversion of Directed Formula
The encoder takes the Boolean encoded directed formula DFbool as input and con-
junct the encoding constrains and the negated property ¬P with it. In this step the
formula to be converted to CNF can be expressed by:
BDF = DFbool ∧ Constraints ∧ ¬P
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Algorithm 4 CreateCNFFormula(DF)
1: Formula = MDG Direct Formula;
2: DFbool = Replace UF’s by introducing term variables;
3: Infer constraints between predicates;
4: Transform predicates to Boolean variables;
5: for each DNFi in DFbool do
6: CNFDNFi = ConvertoCNF(DNFi)
7: end for
8: CNFcomplete = Conjunct all CNFDNFi
9: ReturnCNFcomplete;
After CNF conversions we call this formula a correctness formula:
CorrectnessFormula = CNF (BDF )
Algorithm 4 shows the complete algorithm for the encoding and conversion. A
BDF can be a single DNF formula (representing the set of states) or conjunction






where i is the number of transitions the and DFi is a DNF. So, it is enough to get
the equivalent CNF for each DFi and conjunct them because conjunction of CNF





Linear algorithm for computing CNF (DF ) is well known as Tseitin [73]. In
Tseitin a new variables for every logical gate is introduced. Thus variables impose
a constraint that preserve the function of that gate. Given a DNF formula
(a ∧ b) ∨ (c ∧ d) (4.3)
with Tseitin encoding, a new variable for each subexpression is introduced. In
this example, let us assign the variable x to the ﬁrst ’and’ gate (representing the
subexpression a ∧ b), y for the second ’and’ gate (representing the subexpression
c ∧ d). We also introduce a new variable z to represent the top most operator. For
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Figure 4.3: Tesitin encoding to convert a propositional formula to CNF linearly
DF, the top most operator which is always an ’OR’ gate connected with several
’AND’ gates. Figure 4.3 illustrates the parse tree of our formula. We need to satisfy
the two equivalences:
x⇐⇒ a ∧ b
y ⇐⇒ c ∧ d
(4.4)
The overall CNF formula is the conjunction of the two equivalences written in CNF
as:
(¬x ∨ a) ∧ (¬x ∨ b) ∧ (¬a ∨ ¬b ∨ x)∧
(¬y ∨ c) ∧ (¬y ∨ d) ∧ (¬c ∨ ¬d ∨ y)
The unit clause (z) which represents the top most operator. Instead of (z)
we use (x ∨ y), which represents the same. The converter keeps track by mapping
the Tseitin variable for each logic gates. In the example, Equation (4.4) represents
this mapping. Such mapping will be fed to the goal generator in the next step for
veriﬁcation of the conversion.
4.2.4 Veriﬁcation of the Conversion
Application and improvement of diﬀerent linear algorithms for CNF conversion has




















Figure 4.4: Overview of the DF to CNF conversion-veriﬁcation methodology
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not ﬁnd any automated methodology to formally verify the conversion approach.
This motivated us to give some extra eﬀort and integrate a small tool that formally
veriﬁes our CNF conversion.
Our automated conversion-veriﬁcation methodology in Figure 4.4 using HOL
theorem prover is an extra contribution to the methodology to demonstrates the
correctness of the CNF conversion automatically. The obtained CNF formula is
compared formally to the original DF using the HOL theorem prover. This will
enhance conﬁdence in the whole veriﬁcation process. The veriﬁcation part of the
methodology contains a goal generator and HOL Theorem prover. The goal gener-
ator generates the goal to be proved by the HOL theorem prover. At the end, HOL
provides a decision based on the inputs.
Goal Generator
The goal generator takes the CNF formula, Tseitin variable for each logic gate
mapping generated by the converter and the Boolean encoded DF as input. Given
the Tseitin variable for each logic gate mapping, the assumptions are computed by
the goal generator. The assumptions for the previous conversion example(Figure 4.3)
can be written as:
x = a ∧ b
y = c ∧ d
(4.5)
At the end, the goal generator ends up with generating a complete goal to prove in
HOL:
Assumptions =⇒ EncodedDF ⇐⇒ CNFFormula
Call to the HOL theorem prover
As we mentioned earlier, we used HOL theorem prover to prove the goal. After
generating the goal, the goal generator places a call to the HOL theorem prover.
Given the input goal, the proof is conducted by applying rewriting rules. Note that
49
the goal is generated in such a way that only one Tactic is enough to decide the
goal.
4.2.5 Speciﬁcation of Invariant Property and Correctness
Formula
In our proposed methodology, we check the safety of a design by checking invariant
property. The speciﬁcation is in a commonly encountered generic form of safety
properties, M  Pinit ⇒ AGPs, where Pinit and Ps are instantaneous formulas not
containing temporal operators. A safety property of this form is called invariant and
has the intuitive interpretation that every computation of M , which starts in a state
satisfying Pinit also satisﬁes Ps at all reachable states. For example, heating should
be turned of when the door of a microwave-oven is open. This invariant property
can be expressed in CTL logic as follows:
AG(!(door = open)&(heating = on))
In order to build a correctness formula we consider EF (¬P ); the negation
of the property. The encoder described in 4.2.3 conjuncts the negated property
with the encoding constraints and boolean encoded directed formula. The CNF
representation of this formula is a correctness formula:
Correctnessformula = CNF (Directed formula representing all the reachable states
∧ EncodingConstraints ∧ Negated invariant property).
We use SAT solver to prove the correctness formula UNSAT i.e. contradictory.
For the microwave-oven example, we use the SAT solver to prove that there is a state
where (door = open) and (heating = on). If no such path exist, where such state
occurs, SAT solver will give an UNSAT decision.
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4.2.6 Using SAT as a Veriﬁcation Engine
The use of SAT-solvers in various applications is on the march. As insight on
how to eﬃciently encode problems into SAT is increasing, a growing number of
problem domains are successfully being tackled by SAT-solvers. This is particularly
true for the electronic design automation (EDA) industry [17, 52]. The success
is further magniﬁed by current state-of-the-art solvers being adapted to meet the
speciﬁc characteristics of these problem domains [14, 34].
The method of representing an instance of a search problem as a propositional
formula so that a satisfying assignment represents a solution, and then running a
SAT solver to ﬁnd such an assignment if there is one, has been found to be a practical
and eﬀective method for solving a number of problems. It has been used successfully
in the electronic design automation (EDA) industry for a variety of tasks including
microprocessor veriﬁcation [18] and automated test generation [53] among many
others [58]. Perhaps most notably, SAT-based bounded model checking [71] has
become a widely used veriﬁcation method, and these methods are being extended to
un-bounded model checking [60]. SAT solvers are used as computational engines in
a variety of model checking tools such as NuSMV[2]. SAT solvers, or modiﬁcations
of them, are used as the engines for tools using more expressive logics, including for
problems that we expect are not in NP, such as answer set programming [42, 56],
quantiﬁed boolean formulas and modal logics [43], and even restricted ﬁrst order
theorem proving [1].
The successful SAT-MDG integration as a reduction engine [9] motivated us
to for a new methodology, using the SAT solver as a veriﬁcation engine for MDG
model. Given a correctness formula, a SAT solver can be used to search for a path
such that the property holds true at all the nodes in that path. If at least one such
path exists, then the formula is satisﬁable, indicating that property is true for the
given model. Absence of a feasible path indicates a violation of the property. We
use MiniSAT 2.0 [33] as an eﬃcient SAT solver. As our approach is to prove the
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correctness formula as a tautology, so, a satisﬁable decision by the solver indicates
violation of the property and gives a counter example, whereas an unsat decision
validates the property. If satisﬁable, the assignments constitutes a counter example
to the original(un-negated) formula. Optionally, the satisﬁable assignments can be
substituted in the negation of the formula and a theorem that the counter example
implies the negated formula can be derived. To explain more in detail, in the next
chapter, we will present an illustrative example of SAT based invariant checking.
In this chapter we presented the overview of our proposed methodology. Also
we provided step by step description of our the methodologies with examples. In next




Implementation and Case Study
In this chapter, we discuss the implementation details and experimental results of
our proposed methodology, to integrate SAT as a veriﬁcation engine with MDG.
Unlike other researchers, we implement not just the conversion algorithm to convert
MDG Direct formula (DF) to CNF(which will be fed to the SAT solver), but also
implement an automated veriﬁcation technique to formally verify the conversion.
We present and analyze the experimental results that we obtained for both of the
methodology, supporting the correctness, soundness and performance of them.
5.1 Conversion-Veriﬁcation of Directed Formula
5.1.1 Experiment Description
We implement our methodology in C++ and run it on several diﬀerent sized directed
formulas, each of them containing diﬀerent number of clauses and variables. For the
experiment we considered DF with minimum 100 clauses to maximum 1000 clauses.
Those clauses contain from 38 upto 168 diﬀerent variable. The experiments are
performed under Fedora Core 9 on an Intel Xeon 3.4 GHz processor with 3 GB of




Table 5.1 shows the experimental results. Our program produced a delay of less
than 0.01 second for the DF with less than 100 clauses. Hence, we increased both
the number of clauses and the number of variables with some bigger sized DFs to
check the performance. We observed, a very fast response time of 0.02 second with a
larger DF with 300 clauses of 78 variables. Conversion time increased to 0.04 second
for the DF with 500 clause and 118 variables. The largest DF we tested with our
methodology is 1000 clauses with 168 variables. Out program took only 0.1 second
to compute the CNF of that DF. Figure 5.1 shows a nearly linear behavior for our
implementation. The slight deviations from linearity is ignored(those are caused by
the interruption internal processes of the operating system).
On the other hand, we noticed, the veriﬁcation time in HOL increases with
the size of directed formula. HOL took a few seconds for the veriﬁcation of smaller
sized DFs, but suﬀers for bigger sized DFs while taking a longer time to prove.
As we mentioned earlier, the way we constructed the goal requires only one Tactic
(DECIDE TAC) for proving the goal, which is a positive side for the methodology. For a
DF with 100 clauses, our conversion produced a less than 0.00 second delay, where as
HOL took about 4.010 seconds to verify the conversion. HOL took about 14.901 and
28.021 seconds to prove the conversion of DFs with 300 and 500 clauses, respectively,
Table 5.1: CNF conversion time
DF size No. of variables Conversion time Verification time
100 38 less than 0.01 4.010
200 58 0.01 8.231
300 78 0.02 14.908
400 98 0.03 19.042
500 118 0.04 28.021
700 148 0.06 53.098
1000 168 0.10 93.118
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 Figure 5.1: DF size vs. CNF conversion time
which is more than the conversion time. The veriﬁcation time increases sharply for
the DF with 1000 clauses of 168 variables. But for all cases, HOL successfully
veriﬁed the conversion.
5.2 Integrating SAT with MDG for Invariant Check-
ing
The main goal of our work is to integrate SAT with MDG for a new invariant
checking methodology. In the following subsection, we present a small abstract
counter example to illustrate the approach. Also, we present a case study to show
the performance of our approach.
Abstract Counter Example
In the abstract counter example, we show how we verify the invariant on a design.
Abstract counter example was introduced in [63]. Figure 5.2 shows the state tran-
sition graph of the counter. There are ﬁve control states: c fetch, c load, c inc1,
































Figure 5.2: An abstract counter
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by one, decreased by one or keeps the previous value.
To apply our methodology, we ﬁrst describe the behavior of the counter using
the MDG-HDL language. The counter PC is of abstract sort. The control state
is initialized to c fecth and the initial value of pc is a free variable called init pc
(i.e. the initial value is generalized to any value). The output variables incr and
decr is initialized to ’0’. The MDG tool computes all the reachable states in three
transition steps. Conjunction of these set of states, for each transition, generates
the complete set of reachable states for the design. Preprocessor applies the boolean
encoding and generates a boolean formula BDF along with the encoding constraints.
The Encoder applies the CNF conversion and generates the correctness formula to
be veriﬁed with a SAT solver. We consider the following property to be veriﬁed:
Property 1: Starting from the c fetch state, there is no such state in the future,
where pc is incremented and decremented at the same time. The property can be
expressed as an invariant as following:
AG !(incr = 1 & decr = 1)
We check this invariant using both our SAT-MDG methodology and MDG
tool. Table 5.2 summarizes the result. The SAT-MDG approach including boolean
encoding of directed formula, CNF conversion with correctness formula generation
and using SAT solver for decision took about 0.0422 seconds in total. On the other
hand using MDG as a stand alone tool for the invariant checking took about 0.220
seconds. Even though we use the MDG tool to compute the reachable states, the
negligible veriﬁcation time (in comparison to MDG tool) of MDG-SAT technique
gives us a clear indication about the eﬃciency of our proposed methodology.
57
Table 5.2: Invariant Checking Results with MDG tool and MDG-SAT approach
Property MDG-SAT approach MDG tool
Preprocessing Encoding Decision Total
Time Time Time Time
Property 1 0.02 0.02 0.002295 0.0422 0.220
5.2.1 Case Study: Island Tunnel Controller (ITC)
System Description
The results from abstract counter example motivated us to check the eﬃciency with
larger design. The SAT-MDG reduction technique is demonstrated on the example
of the Island Tunnel Controller (ITC) [9], which was originally introduced by Fisler
and Johnson [39]. We illustrate our SAT-MDG veriﬁcation methodology on the
same example. Based on the information collected by sensors installed at both ends
of the tunnel, the ITC controls the traﬃc lights at both ends of a tunnel : there
is one lane tunnel connecting the mainland to an island. As shown in Figure 5.3,
at each end of the tunnel, there is a traﬃc light. Four sensors are used to detect
the presence of cars: one at tunnel entrance on the island side (ie), one at tunnel
exit on the island side (ix), one at tunnel entrance on the mainland side (me), and
one at tunnel exit on the mainland side (mx). The following constraint is imposed
in [39] : maximum sixteen cars may be on the island at any time. The assumptions
includes all cars are ﬁnite in length, that no car gets stuck in the tunnel, that cars
do not exit the tunnel before entering the tunnel, that cars do not leave the tunnel
entrance without traveling through the tunnel, and suﬃcient distance is maintained
between two cars so that the sensors can distinguish the cars.
As depicted in Figure 5.4, the ITC speciﬁcation is composed of three com-
munication controllers and two counters. The communication controllers are: The
Island Light Controller (ILC), the Tunnel Controller (TC), the Mainland Light Con-
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Figure 5.4: The Island Controller
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(refer to [39] for the state transition diagrams of each component). The Island Light
Controller (ILC) has four states: green, entering, red and exiting. The green and
red lights on the island side are controlled by the outputs igl and irl respectively; iu
denotes that the cars from the island side are currently occupying the tunnel, and
ir denotes that ILC is requesting the tunnel. As shown in Figure 5.4, the input iy
requests the ILC to release the control of the tunnel, and ig grants control of the
tunnel from the island side. For the Mainland Light Controller (MLC), a similar set
of signals is deﬁned. The requests for access issued by ILC and MLC is processed
by The Tunnel Counter (TC). The number of cars currently on the island and in
the tunnel is monitored by the The Island Counter and the Tunnel Counter, respec-
tively. In the case of tunnel controller, the counter tc is increased by 1 depending
on tc+ or decremented by 1 depending on tc- unless it is already 0. The Island
Counter functions in a similar way, except that increment and decrement depend
on ic+ and ic-, respectively: one for the island lights, one for the mainland lights,
and one tunnel controller to process the access requests issued by the other two
controllers.
5.2.2 Implementation Description
Property checking is handy to verify that a speciﬁcation meets the certain require-
ments. In [77, 81, 9],veriﬁcation of Island Tunnel Controller (ITC) thorough Model
checking was performed. Three diﬀerent invariant properties were veriﬁed for this
circuit in [61, 81]. We list below those three properties with their corresponding
CTL formula:
• Property 1: Cars never travel both directions in the tunnel at the same time.
AG(!((igl = 1)&(mgl = 1)))
• Property 2: The tunnel counter is never signaled to increment simultaneously
by the ILC and the MLC.
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AG(!((itc+ = 1)&(mtc+ = 1)))
• Property 3: The island counter is never signaled to increment and decrement
simultaneously. controller requests.
AG(!((ic− = 1)&(ic+ = 1)))
To check the correctness and eﬃciency of our proposed methodology, we modiﬁed
the property in a way so that it fails in both: invariant checking by MDG as a stand
alone tool and SAT-MDG approach :
• Property 1: AG(!((igl = 1)&(mgl = 0)))
• Property 2: AG(!((itc+ = 1)&(mtc+ = 0)))
• Property 3: AG(!((ic− = 1)&(ic+ = 0)))
The MDG tool computes the reachable states for the given MDG-HDL model
of ITC tunnel controller. Although, to ensure the correctness of the design, all
the reachable states should be considered and conjuncted to build the complete
Sreachable, we consider the ﬁrst ﬁve reachable states and the initial state and was able
to identify the violation of property (the granularity can be adjusted to identify the
ﬁrst violation of property). The reason behind that is the implementation of interface
parser to collect the reachable states from the MDG tool and to fed the preprocessor
is not yet available. This is a straight forward implementation issue which can be
implemented easily as future work for the completeness of the methodology. So we
decided not to spend much time on it and concentrate on the other important parts
of the methodology. Also as we use MDG tool for reachability analysis so we don’t
include the reachable state computation time in the MDG-SAT experiential results.
To evaluate three diﬀerent properties, we generate three diﬀerent correctness
formula. An UNSAT decision from SAT solver validates the property whereas a
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SAT decision indicates the violation of the property. For the experiments, solaris
5.10 workstation was used containing a quad-core processor running at 2.5GHz and
having 6 GB of physical memory.
5.2.3 Experiment Results
Table 5.3 summarizes the results of our MDG-SAT approach. Preprocessor im-
poses the boolean encoding on it with adequate constraints. For Property 1 the
preprocessor took only 0.5 seconds and similar time was taken for the other two
properties. Correctness formula is generated by the encoder. Encoder conjuncts
the constraints and the negated property with the directed formula representing
the reachable states. Later on, the encoder generates a correctness formula, i.e an
equivalent CNF representation. In our experiment correctness formula generation
for all the properties took same time, 0.06 seconds because of the similar size of the
property. We check the satisﬁability of the correctness formula using MiniSAT 2.0.
MiniSAT took 0.00361 seconds to fail Property 1. Property 2 and Property 3 took
0.00538 seconds and 0.00539 to fail the property.
We verify those properties with MDG tool and summarize the results in Ta-
ble 5.4. As we use the reachability analysis feature of MDG tool and unable to
extract the time to compute reachable individual set of states, so we don’t com-
pare the results but the table clearly shows the eﬃciency of MDG-SAT approach.
MDG-tool failed Property-1 in 0.95 seconds where as MDG-SAT approach took only
0.11361 seconds to do the same. For Property-2 and Property-3, MDG-tool took
Table 5.3: Total time for SAT-MDG approach
Benchmark Preprocessing Encoding Decision Total
Properties Time Time Time Time
P1 0.05 0.06 0.00361 0.11361
P2 0.04 0.06 0.00538 0.10538
P3 0.04 0.06 0.00539 0.10539
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0.92 and 0.91 seconds. On the other hand, MDG-SAT approach took only 0.10538
and 0.10539 second to fail those same properties. The results show the eﬃcient and
eﬀectiveness of our proposed approach the prospect as a new tool. Implementation
of MDG reachability analysis algorithm in any language will give us a completely
new tool combining both SAT and MDG. Use of MDG to represent the circuit
provides a higher level of abstraction. Also, the use of SAT solver as a fast and
eﬃcient veriﬁcation engine and its fast search algorithm to ﬁnd the states violating
the properties will facilitate the tool.
In this chapter, we presented the results of our proposed conversion-veriﬁcation
methodology and SAT based invariant checking methodology. From the results we
observed that our SAT-MDG methodology is very eﬃcient and the fast veriﬁcation
time gives us the indication about the prospect of a new tool development using
our methodology . Also, the experimental results of conversion-veriﬁcation method-
ology showed the correctness and soundness of our approach while increasing the
conﬁdence in whole veriﬁcation approach.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future work
MDG based model checking is an improvement over traditional BDD-based model-
checking [13]. The design is represented in a higher level of abstraction, simplifying
the data path operations. As a result, users can eﬀectively deal with the state
explosion problem. Integrating SAT with MDG is a new concept to enhance the
performance of safety checking and our proposed methodology for the new tool
shows the eﬃciency through the experimental results.
In our work, we propose the integration of a SAT solver with MDG as a ver-
iﬁcation engine. We presented a conversion-veriﬁcation methodology for the CNF
conversion of MDG DF with veriﬁcation of this conversion. This enhances the con-
ﬁdence in whole veriﬁcation approach. Our automated veriﬁcation technique for
the CNF conversion is a new contribution to this ﬁeld of research. Researchers
working with CNF conversions inspired by Tseitin algorithm, or slight modiﬁca-
tion/enhancement of Tseitin algorithm can easily apply this automated technique
to formally verify their conversion. In chapter 5, experimental results with diﬀerent
sized formula showed the correctness of our approach.
We presented our main contribution, the proposed methodology to integrate
the SAT solver with MDG for veriﬁcation of safety properties in Chapter 4. The in-
variant checking results of abstract counter example presented in chapter 5 indicates
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the improvement of performance. Later on, the Island Tunnel Counter(ITC) case
study shows the eﬃciency of our invariant checking approach. We claim, our imple-
mentation of the methodology, is a prototype for a new tool for eﬃcient invariant
checking.
Using SAT solver as a veriﬁcation engine with MDG has a wide range of re-
search area. Our future work includes to apply this conversion-veriﬁcation technique
with algorithms other than Tseitin. The experimental result showed that with in-
creasing the number of DFs, HOL suﬀers to prove the goal with larger runtime.
This gives us more area to improve the performance. However, diﬀerent goal gen-
eration techniques with and without quantiﬁers can also be a good research topic.
Also, using diﬀerent algorithms on MDG DF for CNF conversion and comparing
diﬀerent SAT solver’s performance for invariant checking can also be interesting. As
a continuation of this research work of integrating SAT with MDG, some new and
interesting case studies will also be handy. So, future directions will concentrate on
experimenting the methodology with industrial circuits and comparing the results
with other industrial model checkers.
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